🔒 Fix potential memory exhaustion in socket reads (#59)

Addresses a security vulnerability where the daemon or client could be
forced to allocate up to 10MB of memory per malformed socket message,
potentially leading to Out-Of-Memory (OOM) crashes.

Changes:
- Introduced a central `MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE` constant of 128KB in `src/types/socket.rs`.
- Enforced the 128KB limit on incoming requests in `src/bin/daemon.rs`.
- Enforced the 128KB limit on incoming responses in `src/utils/daemon.rs`.
- Preserved detailed `eprintln!` logging when messages are rejected.

Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

src/types/socket.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
 
+pub const MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = 128 * 1024;
+
 #[derive(Default, Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
 pub struct Request {
     pub name: String,